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Abstract
These days, many systems are developed applying various UML notations to represent the structure and
behavior of (technical) systems. In addition, for safety critical systems like Railway Interlocking Systems
(RIS) the fulﬁllment of safety requirements is demanded. UML-based Railway Interlocking (UML-based
RI) is proposed as a methodology in designing and developing RIS. It consists of infrastructure objects and
UML is used to model the system behavior. This design is validated and demonstrated by using simulation
with Rhapsody. Automated veriﬁcation techniques like model checking have become a standard for proving
the correctness of state-based systems. Unfortunately, one major problem of model checking is the state
space explosion if too many objects have to be taken into account. Multi-object checking circumvents the
state space explosion by checking one object at a time. We present an approach to enhance multi-object
checking by generating counterexamples in a sequence diagram fashion providing scenarios for model-based
testing.
Keywords: Scenario Generation, Counterexample Generation, State Modeling, Multi-Object Checking,
UML-based Railway Interlocking System
1 Introduction
Nowadays, during diﬀerent phases of system development, Uniﬁed Modeling Lan-
guage (UML) notations [19] is used as the modeling tool to specify the structure
and behavior of (technical) systems. These systems contain components or objects
that interact via channels or a bus in order to provide a speciﬁed functionality. In
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addition, for safety critical systems like Railway Interlocking Systems (RIS) the ful-
ﬁllment of safety requirements is demanded. The proof that a safety critical system
provides safe operation determines the conformance to the desired safety integrity
level (SIL) of such a system [5,2]. In general, safety critical systems are demanded
to reach SIL 4, the highest level. According to EN 50128 [5], SIL 4 RIS highly
recommend a proof that the safety requirements are fulﬁlled up to a tolerable level
by the RIS software.
RIS are responsible for establishing safe routes for trains that are scheduled to
pass through or stop at a railway station. Safe routes ensure that trains cannot be
driven into tracks that are occupied or may become occupied by other trains. A safe
route ensures the proper settings of infrastructure elements like points and signals
along the route. These elements can be modeled using UML class diagrams and
UML state machines [15,3]. The next step is to prove that a model of a concrete
interlocking is working correctly and that it conforms the safety requirements. Such
requirements are the absence of conﬂicting routes, etc. Automated veriﬁcation
techniques like model checking have become a standard for proving the correctness
of state-based systems. Unfortunately, model checking suﬀers from the state space
explosion problem if too many objects have to be taken into account.
Multi-object checking [11] circumvents the state space explosion by its nature
checking one object at a time. Multi-object checking relies on the sound and com-
plete multi-object logics D1 and D0 [9] that are based on well-known logics like CTL
or LTL. D1 is supposed to be more intuitive for speciﬁcation, as the interaction
among diﬀerent objects can be speciﬁed. However, it cannot be veriﬁed directly
applying model checking. Formulas in D1 can be translated into an equivalent set
of D0 formulas. Each checking condition is bound to a particular object in a D0
formula. As a result, D0 formulas can be veriﬁed automatically by model checking.
There are similar properties between multi-object checking and traditional model
checking. They provide an automatic proof that a certain (safety) property holds.
In addition, model checking provides the opportunity to analyze a system model
if the checking condition does not hold. If a model violates a checking condition,
multi-object checking provides a counterexample from a model checking tool for
the outermost object. Taking the mentioned communication with other objects
into account, this counterexample trace had to be analyzed manually. We propose
an observer-based approach to synthesize a multi-object counterexample that is
closed with respect to interaction of objects.
Model checking tools like SPIN [14] or SMV/NuSMV [18,4] incorporate the
ability to illustrate that a model does not satisfy a checking condition with a textual,
a tabular or a sequence chart-like representation of the involved states. We believe
that a graphical representation like message sequence charts is the most convenient
one from a users point of view to illustrate a counterexample in a multi-object
system. Beyond providing a graphical representation for certain scenarios, sequence
charts have been successfully applied to generate test cases [7]. In this contribution,
we present an approach for generating test cases automatically based on the system
speciﬁcation instead of deriving them manually.
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2 Railway Interlocking Systems
RIS are often designed speciﬁcally according to the layouts of stations. When the
layout of a station is changed, the corresponding RIS has to be modiﬁed. This causes
high costs for resources and time [23]. In order to reduce the eﬀort in modifying
RIS, one can develop RIS under the object oriented approach. With this approach,
it is only necessary to specify the new neighboring structure of the objects when the
layout of the station is changed instead of modifying the whole interlocking system
completely.
The geographical interlocking is used as the internal logic of the interlocking
system that consists of infrastructure elements as objects. The objects interact
among each other with events and actions to develop safe routes. Objects, events
and actions can be captured by using state modeling. In [1] Statemate [13] is
proposed and applied to model the functional requirements of interlocking systems.
In contrast, in this work, UML state machines are used for state modeling. RIS
that are developed by applying the geographical interlocking and using UML as
speciﬁcation tool are called UML-based Railway Interlockings (UML-based RI).
Figure 1 shows the railway station CStadt that is used to check the feasibility
of developing a UML-based RI. There are diﬀerent kinds of infrastructure elements
that are located within this station: tracks, points and signals.
Fig. 1. Track layout of station CStadt
Tracks are the basic infrastructure elements that trains move on. The authorized
movement of railway vehicles on the tracks can be classiﬁed into train movements
and shunting movements. Train movements are only allowed on main tracks, while
making up a train, called shunting movements, are undergone only on sidings [20].
In ﬁgure 2, main tracks are GA1, GA2, GA3 and GA4. Only train movements are
analyzed in the current model of UML-based RI. Instead of moving only straight
ahead, trains can also turn to another track via turnouts or crossing. Turnouts
and crossing are composed of points. Points (e.g., W1) can be set to right and left
position. In order to ensure the train can be driven into the current track, RIS need
to ensure the correct position of points.
Fig. 2. Station CStadt in UML-based RI
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Along the track, one can ﬁnd another kind of infrastructure component: the
signal. Signals (e.g., P1) can be used to control train movements by showing the
aspects. Two types of aspects will be considered in this work, they are clear and
stop aspect. Some signals can also indicate the allowed speed of the corresponding
track section. Indication of speed will not be considered in the current work.
As mentioned before, the main task of RIS is to develop a safe route for the
approaching train. There are two requirements of a safe route. First, the infras-
tructure elements along the route have been properly set. For example, the points
are set in the correct positions and no other trains can be driven into the safe route
from the divergent direction. Flank protection is used to prevent other trains to
drive into a safe route via points. Furthermore, no conﬂicting routes are issued
at the same time as the safe route. This means the infrastructure elements which
belong to the route can only be used exclusively by one train. If the requested
route of the approaching train fulﬁlls those requirements, in other words, it is a safe
route, then this route and the infrastructure elements along this route will be locked
exclusively for this train. No other train can use the same route, so that collisions
can be avoided. The mentioned safety requirements can be ensured by executing
two procedures: checking the availability of infrastructure elements and providing
ﬂank protection for the route.
3 Multi-Object Systems and Multi-Object Checking
One of the possible solutions in handling the state space explosion is to develop
a method, such that a condition can be veriﬁed without building up the complete
state space and only those state variables of objects that are involved in the con-
dition are considered during the veriﬁcation. In this approach, the correctness of a
formula which involves a single object can be veriﬁed by checking the state space of
this object locally and this type of formula can be called a local condition. When
there are more objects deﬁned, a formula is called a global condition. This global
condition can be broken down into a set of local conditions of each object and com-
munications between objects. The correctness of the global condition can be ensured
by checking those local conditions and the existence of communications among the
objects. Multi-object checking is a method that comprises the above ideas. It can
be used to verify state-based multi-object system eﬃciently without building the
complete state space. In multi-object checking, the system consists of objects and
objects communicate among each other synchronously in an RPC-like fashion. The
communication between objects must be speciﬁed before the veriﬁcation. Each of
the objects has a signature that describes its properties, for example, its attributes,
actions and valid propositions. This signature can for example be captured in an
Finite State Machine (FSM).
Let I be a ﬁnite set of identities representing sequential objects. Misusing termi-
nology slightly, we speak of object i when we mean the object with identity i. Each
object i ∈ I has an individual set Pi of atomic state predicate symbols, its signature.
In applications, these predicate symbols may express the values of attributes, which
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Fig. 3. Syntax deﬁnition of Multi-Object Logic D
1
(with local logic LTL)
actions are enabled, which actions have occurred, etc.
We use the multi-object logic D1 (cf. ﬁgure 3) as described in [9,10] with a local
logic i.LiLTL1 over signature Pi for each object i ∈ I. D1 allows to use formulas
j:LjLTL1 , j!L
jLTL
1 , j?L
jLTL
1 etc. for any other object j ∈ I as subformulas within
i.L
iLTL
1 . These constituents are called communication subformulas.
The global conditions that involve more than one object are speciﬁed by the
multi-object logic D1. Logic D1 allows one to specify temporal formulas or propo-
sitions that an object i fulﬁlls locally. It also allows one to specify temporal
formula or propositions that other objects satisfy for an object if there is syn-
chronized communication between them. For example, a formula o1.(¬EF(state =
critical ∧ o2:(state = critical)) means that there exists a synchronized communica-
tion currently between objects o1 and o2, such that o2 guarantees for o1 that o2 is
in the critical state (cf. ﬁgure 4). o2:(state = critical) is called the communication
sub-formula in this method.
Fig. 4. Objects o1 and o2 must not reside in the critical section together:
o1.(¬EF(state = critical ∧ o2:(state = critical)))
There is a sublogic of D1 called D0 (cf. ﬁgure 5). Formulas that involve com-
munication with diﬀerent objects cannot be expressed in D0 directly. However, the
synchronized communication between two objects can be explicitly speciﬁed with
the properties of the objects in D0.
[9] presents a transformation to break global D1 checking conditions down into
sets of D0 conditions and communication symbols (cf. ﬁgure 6). These symbols have
to be matched with existing ones according to the communication requirements.
In addition, D0 conditions can be veriﬁed locally. Informally, the communication
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symbols are determined inside out. A D1 formula ψ holds iﬀ the outermost D0
formula ψ′ holds. This is elaborated in [17,11].
ψ ≡ i.(. . . j:(ϕ) . . .)
↙ ↘
ψ′ ≡ i.(. . . q:j . . .) ϕ′ ≡ j.(q:i⇒ ϕ)
Fig. 6. D
1
to D
0
transformation
3.1 Model Checking
Multi-object checking has been demonstrated successfully using model checking to
determine the communication symbols and to match with existing ones according
to the communication requirements in [11]. Model checking consists in verifying a
system against a checking condition, also called a formula (M |= φ, M is the model
and φ is the formula).
The system that needs to be veriﬁed is speciﬁed as a (labeled) transition system
T and is called the model M . A transition system T = (S, s0, L,→) consists of a
set of states S (s0 ∈ S is the initial state) with labeled transitions (L set of labels;
→ ⊆ S × L× S is a set of labeled transitions) [24].
Any checking condition that the system needs to satisfy is deﬁned in temporal
logic [16,6] and is called formula φ. In model checking, temporal logic is used to
describe the properties of the system over time. Temporal logic models time as a
sequence of states. As a result, one can use temporal logic to describe conditions
that have to hold as the system evolves [16]. Unfortunately, model checking suﬀers
from the state space explosion problem [22] if too many objects have to be taken
into account during the process of veriﬁcation.
A widely used feature of model checking is the ability to generate counterexam-
ples if a checking condition is evaluated to FALSE. Each counterexample consists of
a sequence of states illustrating the inconformity. The quality of counterexamples
has been discussed in [12].
As no model checking tool can determine which sequence of states is suitable to
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illustrate the error if diﬀerent sequences may be chosen, estimating the quality of
a speciﬁc counterexample is based on the view of the user. However, little progress
has been achieved in this area [8]. The representation of counterexamples varies
among the model checking tools. Most of them oﬀer a textual representation of the
sequence of states whereas other tools make use of tables or sequence diagrams.
3.2 Multi-Object Checking Counterexamples
As mentioned above, in multi-object checking, a D1 formula holds iﬀ the outermost
D0 formula holds. Otherwise, a counterexample has to be generated if this D0 for-
mula does not hold. If model checking is used to verify the outermost D0 formula,
an initial part of a counterexample is generated. This forms a part of a global
counterexample and it is called a local counterexample. If the initial local coun-
terexample does not contain communication with further objects, it is the global
multi-object checking counterexample. Similarly, whenever the local counterexam-
ple contains communication with further objects, the local counterexample is a part
of a global counterexample.
We concentrate on the class of multi-object checking counterexamples in which
communication among objects exists. The initial state of all transition systems,
does not contain any communication. Consequently, the initial local counterexample
refers to model checking counterexamples of ﬁnite or inﬁnite length. The order of
communication between the objects’s communication partners has to be preserved.
The algorithm is executed as follows:
• Apply model checking for each object which is identiﬁed as a communication
partner of the object under investigation.
• Check whether the communication can be preserved for each of the objects.
• Whenever a further communication partner is discovered iterate the algorithm
until all communication is covered.
This algorithm works on the grounds that each communication partner pro-
vides a corresponding communication scheme. As it has been mentioned before,
it is diﬃcult to determine the expressiveness of a counterexample, the selection of
a random counterexample for each object does not guarantee that a global coun-
terexample can be generated. Whenever a communication partner of an object
does not provide a demanded communication scheme one of the possibilities is that,
the counterexample of this object has not been properly chosen. This issue can be
solved by automatically selecting a diﬀerent counterexample for the initiating object
that shows a diﬀerent communication scheme. Alternatively, users can interactively
examine the part of the global counterexample that has been generated so far.
Both solutions show drawbacks. The ﬁrst solution implements a kind of
greedy/backtracking algorithm with all the well-known (dis-)advantages. The more
often local counterexamples have to be regenerated, the less eﬃcient the algorithm
is. Finally, the global counterexample may not illustrate the error that clear as
expected. In contrast, applying the second strategy, the user may not have enough
information to decide whether the partial global counterexample shows the origin
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of the error. These observations constitute the following strategy for veriﬁcation
driven counterexample generation:
• Depending on a user-speciﬁed timeout, generate diﬀerent local counterexamples.
• If time runs out, the user can judge whether the actual counterexample is useful.
• If the user cannot take any advantage of the given counterexample, he can guide
the algorithm by providing domain knowledge.
3.3 Application of the Counterexample Generation Algorithm to UML-based RI
We have introduced a UML-based RI in Section 2. Checking conditions (e.g., if
an infrastructure object o is not in use (state = unused), it is always possible to
establish a route (lock = route) using this object: F := o.(G (state = unused) ⇒
F (lock = route)) that the model is expected to fulﬁll need to be deﬁned. In [15],
similar requirements have been checked by simulation, model checking and multi-
object checking.
The algorithm of generating counterexamples that has been mentioned can be
demonstrated by checking condition F . As checking condition F does not hold
initially, we have easily discovered the erroneous situation: GA3 may not be in
use but it may receive a route request from both neighbors W3 and W1. In this
case the safe (but not functional) response is to reject both route requests rr . We
have applied the counterexample generation algorithm and created two observers
for objects W3 and W1 in the ﬁrst step (cf. ﬁgure 7).
Fig. 7. Rejection of two concurrent route requests
The observer for W3 monitors the behavior of W3 such that a transition t′ ∈ T ′
in the observer automaton is a projection of those transitions t ∈ T in W3 that have
the same communication. A state in the observer automaton represents states and
transitions that occur between the transitions ti and ti+1 in the automaton of W3.
Checking whether W3 can communicate with GA3 as expected can be evaluated
by checking if the behavior of the observer automaton is possible (cf. ﬁgure 8). W3
and its observer synchronize on the transitions speciﬁed in the observer.
The generated sequence chart in ﬁgure 9 presents a global scenario out of the
interlocking’s perspective. It has been generated in the same way as described
above.
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Fig. 8. Creation of two observers for objects W3 and W1
Fig. 9. Conﬂicting routes may be established one after the other
3.4 Generation of Test Cases by Multi-Object Checking
Test cases are typically derived manually from a given speciﬁcation. This derivation
models a part of the system. These test cases can also be used to model the
developed system’s behavior. Both, the system design model and the test model
may contain errors.
In the railway domain, many checking conditions φ, given by a (formal) spec-
iﬁcation, deﬁne implications that some conclusion ω holds under some premises
λ [21]. Most of the premises and conclusions deﬁne a certain state in the
system and constitute checking conditions which share the following structure:
G((λ1∧λ2∧ . . . λn)⇒ Fω). As each λx, 1 ≤ x ≤ n belongs to a particular object i, a
D1 formula that is compliant to the communication requirements among objects can
be formulated. A formula φexample := G((λshared track element ∧ λroute1 ∧ λroute2) ⇒
F(ωshared track element)) is translated as follows:
φD1 example := shared track element.(G((λshared track element∧
route1:(λroute1) ∧ route2:(λroute2))⇒ F(ωshared track element)))
Let all such checking conditions φ evaluate to TRUE by verifying the system
model beforehand. We automatically derive checking conditions φtest by negating
the conclusion: G(λ1 ∧ λ2 ∧ . . . λn ⇒ ¬Fω). The negation is applied to the D1
formulas as well. We derive the following checking condition to generate a test case
for checking condition φD1 example:
φ
D1 example
test := shared track element.(G((λshared track element∧
route1:(λroute1) ∧ route2:(λroute2))⇒
¬F(ωshared track element)))
Such checking conditions obviously evaluate to FALSE by multi-object checking
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and suitable counterexamples are generated applying the greedy/backtracking al-
gorithm (cf. Section 3.2). They illustrate possible evolutions of the system from
the initial state to the state in which the condition (¬Fω) does not hold. These
evolutions can be used to specify test cases automatically if a mapping of states in
the design model to the implementation is given.
In [7], a translation of Message Sequence Charts into Testing and Test Control
Notation Version 3 (TTCN-3) test cases is given. In combination with the generated
sequence chart for a checking condition φD1test and an appropriate mapping to the
implementation, a TTCN-3 test case can be derived easily.
For the railway domain, requirements coverage has been accepted as the coverage
criterion with regard to all requirements that apply to already installed interlocking
systems, as the risk generated by such a system has been tolerated for years or even
decades. If all requirements are atomic in such sense that each of the requirements
belongs to a single test case, applying all these test cases successfully will ﬁnalize
the test process.
4 Conclusion
In this contribution, a strategy for generating counterexamples for multi-object
checking is described. We have demonstrated the usefulness of our strategy by a
case study featuring a UML-based RI. RIS are considered as safety critical systems.
The guarantee of the correct behavior throughout the system lifecycle is demanded.
In order to save resources in developing and modifying RIS for amended railway
layouts, an object oriented approach for establishing interlocking systems is investi-
gated in this work. Infrastructure elements are considered as infrastructure objects
in a UML-based RI. The objects of a RIS cooperate with each other to function as
an interlocking system.
Multi-object checking has been successfully applied to verify UML-based RIS.
We concentrate on verifying the safety aspect of the model. The provided graphical
counterexample in this contribution helped correcting the state machines displaying
the obviously unhandled situation. We believe that this methodology that improves
the understanding and communication among professions of diﬀerent disciplines, can
improve the whole development process of a system.
We have also shown a further step of improving system development by designing
a more comprehensible veriﬁcation strategy. It provides illustrative counterexam-
ples and generates test cases automatically. Therefore, we have demonstrated how
TTCN-3 test cases can be derived from checking conditions during the early stage
of system development.
The positive feedback from railway engineers who are familiar with sequence
chart notations suggests the further development of the user interface of our tool.
Future work will enhance the counterexample generation process by the concurrent
determination of multi-object checking communication symbols and reusing interim
results during the veriﬁcation process.
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